



# Lloyds Register Safety Accelerator

## Final Report

### Automatic anonymising and desensitising of health and safety data

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# Introduction

## Overview of challenge

Lloyds Register Foundation (LR) were looking for innovative proposals for solutions that are able to accurately and expediently desensitise and anonymise health and safety information sources. This might include information held in both structured and unstructured data formats, contained in spreadsheets, databases and reports. The latter might include reports in Word documents, pdf's, or any other machine readable file formats, including both short (e.g. a few pages) as well as longer (>50 pages) volumes.

## Proposed solution

The solution calls for a tool that is able to i) find where sensitive data is within large unstructured (and possibly structured) datasets and across various file formats, ii) flag where that particular data might be, and iii) automatically isolate sensitive data from the original dataset.

The Data X-Ray is Ohalo's proprietary automated data discovery and mapping tool which uses machine learning technology for data protection compliance and data governance purposes ("Data X-Ray").

The Data X-Ray features connectors built for both unstructured and structured data sources in all principal file formats to i) extract data from its original format, ii) analyse that data to discover potentially sensitive items, iii) separate sensitive data from non-sensitive data, and iv) output that data to a usable format.

The solution is a service installed within an HSE environment and provided to HSE and its partners to share and redact data with the goals of:

- Sharing data with research partners (in particular, the University of Manchester) in a GDPR compliant way
- Having third party industry partners and other subject matter experts able to share data with HSE in a GDPR compliant way
- Evaluating automatic basic document organization and categorization tasks with machine learning to prepare large data sets for more effective analysis in the future.

## The Pilot

### What was done?

Ohalo set up a server at HSE's premises with an instance of the Data X-Ray. The server took in data from an HSE data source (HSE RIDDOR report data, details in Results section, below), analysed that data for personal data, and redacted it.

A team led by the HSE data science team looked for any sensitive information that had not been redacted and the ability to personally identify individuals or entities by 'joining up the dots', for instance by linking PII data to public data to infer identity.

Where false or true positives were discovered by the HSE team, the Data X-Ray enabled the team to update the models with example training information to facilitate improved redaction results. Multiple techniques were used to update the models, such as adding new ML classes, dictionaries, and regular expressions and some backend data engineering techniques that involved ensuring word tokens are correctly combined to achieve better token concatenation. As a visual description, the images below explain how an additional regex can be added to the model.

**DATA XRAY** CLOUD

Browse Datasources Search Datasources Casefiles Data Tracking Rules

demo

**Details**

**NAME**  
Choose a name for this class. Whenever scans find examples of this class, they will be labelled with this name.

Sample Regex

**CATEGORY**  
Use categories to organize your classes and find different types of sensitive data.

Personal Data

**DETECTION RULES**  
Select how the system should detect this.

- **AI Training:** Use training data to detect data with similar properties.
- **Dictionary:** Detect instances of specific data.
- **Regex:** Use a regular expression to match data.

Regex

SAVE CLASS

Image 1: Creating a regex (1)

**DATA XRAY** CLOUD

Browse Datasources Search Datasources Casefiles Data Tracking Rules

demo

**\* Regular expression**

The regular expression class looks for data matching its pattern. In the textbox below, enter the regular expression pattern to use. See the [Regex Guide](#) (opens in new window) for help with the pattern syntax.

**PATTERN**  
Enter the pattern to use.

\d{8}-\d{3}

SAVE PATTERN

**TEST FORM**  
Use the test form below to see how your pattern performs against a set of sample data.

12345678-123 ✓ Match

12345678 ✗ No match

Sample 3

[Add more samples](#)

Image 2: Creating a regex (2)

Issues identified were usually tractable and resulted in a very high number of records to be appropriately anonymised as to result in a very small percentage of records that would have resulted in a data breach (as below, there are around 10 records out of 1998 that Ohalo considers to be difficult to redact in an automated way with Ohalo's current technology). However, it was identifying these issues in the first place that proved to be a challenge at scale.

To illustrate this point, one of the biggest problems that the team ran into during the engagement was automatically comparing the results of the automated anonymisation to the results of the manual anonymisation to identify issues that need to be fixed and ensuring that the fixes implemented did not inadvertently create other issues. This was first done with manual review of the results but it was soon found to be difficult to do even with the 1998 records that we were comparing against. Therefore the HSE team developed a Python script that automatically compared the results of the Data X-Ray through its API and against the manually redacted records.

Subsequently, an independent team at the HSE graded the accuracy of the redaction and in tandem with Ohalo iteratively improved the accuracy of the models used to redact the data. This involved an iterative process between one staff at HSE and one at Ohalo to identify false negatives and false positives and understanding why those false negatives and false positives occurred. In addition to checking the results with the automated script that HSE developed, another staff at HSE checked and graded the final results.

### **Was it on time and on budget?**

The project experienced delays at the beginning due to HSE's internal data privacy requirements around data transfer to Ohalo-accessible servers. Therefore the project ran several months over schedule due to those approval processes.

The project was delivered on budget.

## **Results**

### **Did the new solution improve on existing solutions used by HSE?**

The effectiveness of Ohalo Data X-Ray anonymisation was evaluated in comparison to manual anonymisation. This evaluation was based on RIDDOR data used for the Construction Division RIDDOR dashboard (<https://www.hse.gov.uk/construction-dashboard/>) which was manually anonymised in 2017 and made public.

The standard of assessment used for significant breach is that of the ICO was that there will likely be a risk to people's rights and freedoms.<sup>1</sup>

From the 1998 RIDDOR reports analysed 743 contained sensitive. Anonymisation using Ohalo Data X-Ray resulted in 94 retaining some PII of which 19 would be considered sufficient for a significant breach. Assuming that all RIDDORs containing PII would be considered sufficient for a significant breach this has reduced the number of sensitive records by 97%.

Whilst the data cannot be considered fully effectively anonymised, the data sensitivity, and hence impact of a breach and resultant risk, has been reduced very significantly. This and in concert with Data Processing Agreements allowed a better evaluation of the remaining residual risk in data sharing.

Table 1 summarises the final results from the HSE final report.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/personal-data-breaches/>

Table 1: Record statistics extracted from the Evaluation Spreadsheet

Description	No. of records	Comment
Total No. of HSE RIDDOR records evaluated	1998	
No. of records <u>manually</u> anonymised (containing sensitive text)	743	Note that a small amount of sensitive information was not redacted manually e.g. Brand names
No. of records having no sensitive text in need of removal	1255	As assessed by manual anonymisers
No. of records <u>auto</u> -anonymised by Data X-Ray	1070	This figure exceeds the 743 manually anonymised, principally due to over redaction of time period entities alongside dates.

Of the 1998 records analysed, only 743 needed sensitive text removed (i.e. 1255 records contained no sensitive information).

Of the 743 manually anonymised records, 213 (29%) were identically auto-anonymised by Data X-Ray.

The majority of the differences are due to both under and over redaction by Data X-Ray. However, some minor differences are also due to manual alterations (e.g. spelling corrections) made to the original records during the anonymisation process; and also some differences due to manual under redaction; 69 of the manually redacted records retained elements of 'sensitive' text e.g. tool brand names, first name, company acronyms, motorway name. **This serves to show that even manual redaction is not 100% consistent; in this case individual assessments of sensitivity led to differing decisions with sensitive elements that were not PII.**

There was some over-redaction of text, primarily of time periods. Of greater concern was under-redacted sensitive text, i.e. that which Data X-Ray allowed to 'slip through the net'. Table 2 lists the categories and the number of records retaining sensitive text. (Note that a single record may contain text from multiple categories i.e. there is some overlap within the reported figures).

Table 2: Under Redaction Details

Category of under-redacted sensitive text		No. of records	Percentage (relative to 743 manual anonymised records)	Percentage (relative to 1998 total records analysed)
No of Data X-ray <b>under</b> redacted records Of which:		267	36%	13%
	PII (Significant Breach)	94 (19)	13% (3%)	5% (1%)
	Gender (Title)	48	6%	2%
	Company Name	42	6%	2%
	Location	83	11%	4%
	Date	34	5%	2%
	Reference No.	31	4%	2%

Of the 1998 total records, 94 records retained PII, and only 19 were considered to be a significant breach of GDPR, as defined by the method of assessment outlined above. **This serves to show that the Data X-Ray's automated anonymization removes PII resulting in 99%+ of the records being anonymised.**

## Business case and commercial feasibility

The pilot proved that we can successfully redact personal and sensitive health and safety data from unstructured data sets to a very high degree of accuracy. Using this data, HSE will be able to share data with third party researchers, for the furthering of HSE's mission to prevent death, injury and ill health to those at work and those affected by work activities. However it is ultimately up to the discussions at HSE in terms of what an acceptable level of risk would be, given the existing controls in place around their data sharing partners. On a wider basis, this also provides a sound basis for the use of automatic anonymisation technology to share health and safety data between organisations for research as part of the data minimisation process.

The problem set that HSE has: the anonymisation / redaction of 0.6m RIDDOR reports (and over 1m other different types of documents) is not a tractable problem with manual techniques. It was calculated that it would take HSE up to 12.5 person years of time just to start with the 0.6m existing RIDDOR reports, much less the stream of reports that come in every month (up to 10,000/month) and the other documents needing anonymisation.

Additionally, manual redaction was shown to be imperfect, leaving 69 out of 2,000 records with sensitive data remaining in them.

The techniques available with the Data X-Ray allow HSE to anonymise data at a speed and accuracy and cost not possible using manual processes. In general it takes around 0.2 seconds per analysis and redaction of a single document (on a small server around 20,000 words per second), which means that automated anonymization of the original 0.6m document set removing 99% of PII is possible within 1.4 days of server time (instead of 12.5 years) and the ongoing monthly server time for the 10,000 documents is around 33 server minutes.

The end result is that HSE is able to unlock their very valuable data science personnel to drive value towards the *analysis* of the data rather than the *engineering* of the data.

## Next steps

On the technical side, there is further work to be done to further reduce under-redacted PII, with several open issues. With the overall aim of automating the anonymization process, the outstanding issues will be minimised programmatically to the extent possible, for instance by adding extra processing to search the full text a second time, to look for versions of successfully identified entities. Ohalo anticipate that resolving the outstanding issues on a programmatic basis could potentially reduce the 'Significant Breach' count to just 10 records instead of 19, or in other words, 99.5% of records successfully anonymized.

The results of this evaluation are intended to serve as a basis for discussion and to allow a definition of what an acceptable level of risk would be, given the existing controls in place. This will guide future evaluations and identify what the next steps are, either in process improvement, evaluation or data anonymisation.


On a practical basis, there are three cases for deploying the Data X-Ray in production for the HSE and their partners. The first is deployment of the Data X-Ray in a production environment to continue the work on anonymization of HSE's current data such as RIDDOR reports.

The second is deployment of a service for HSE's partners where data from HSE's partners can be shared more easily between themselves to prevent death, injury and ill health to those at work and those affected by work activities not only within the UK but hopefully around the world.

Lastly, the third is an HSE project on data anonymisation whose purpose is to anonymise data for long term archival. While still ongoing, the plan is to produce a generic anonymised record for archival and future research when HSE discards the original RIDDOR record (or other data of research interest) after 10 years. Anything like this that HSE generates and has national value will eventually be put in the National Archives.

However it is ultimately up to HSE in terms of what an acceptable level of risk is, this is determined by HSE's information asset owners. Assuming that the HSE accepts the risk of 99%+ anonymisation, the intention is to pursue these cases in a production environment.

## Appendix A: Screenshots illustrating evaluation methodology



Class	Sensitivity	Redaction Method	Count
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Date (SQL Datetime)	Non-sensitive	Regex	OK
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Date (U.S.)	Non-sensitive	Regex	OK
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Dates	Non-sensitive	AI	604
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Email	Personal Data	Regex	OK
<input type="checkbox"/> Email (AI-trained)	Personal Data	AI	285
<input type="checkbox"/> Ethnicity / Race - UK ONS	Special Personal Data	Dictionary	18
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Event	Non-sensitive	NLP	OK
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Facility	Personal Data	NLP	OK
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Financial Data	Non-sensitive	AI	535
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> First Name (English)	Personal Data	AI	22 K
<input type="checkbox"/> Gender	Personal Data	Dictionary	4
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Geo-political Entity	Personal Data	NLP	OK
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Group Identity	Special Personal Data	NLP	OK
<input type="checkbox"/> Health - Diseases and Conditions (CDC)	Special Personal Data	AI	529
<input type="checkbox"/> IATA Format Flight Numbers	Non-sensitive	AI	40 K
<input type="checkbox"/> IP Address	Personal Data	Regex	OK
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Language	Non-sensitive	NLP	OK

Figure 1 : Screenshot of the customizable classifier functionality within Data X-Ray. Classes are redacted in the order : Dictionary, Regular Expression Matching, NLP and lastly Artificial Intelligence.. Users can select which classes to redact, modify existing default classes or create new customised classes.





## Appendix B: General observed redaction anomalies

### Over redaction

The following regular Over redaction anomalies have been noted:

1. The majority of the over redacted entities relate to phrases associated with periods of time e.g.  
the next day    DATE  
the weekend    DATE
2. Full stop adjacent to an entity or date, often redacts too much (back-end process error)  
FPS.There    ACRONYM3\_HSE  
point.in plant room    FACILITY  
31/03/17.Please    DATE (INTERNATIONAL)  
27 May 2013.Given    DATE

In the above examples the text before or after the full-stop is incorporated into the identified sensitive entity, and is therefore removed without need. This is a low priority issue, but one that would need Ohalo to resolve.

### Under redaction

Having reviewed the types of text that is 'missed' by Data X-Ray, there appears to be some categories that repeat regularly, and therefore will be reported and discussed with Ohalo to determine the best resolution solution going forward. This may require some more general modifications to Data X-Ray and/or best rectified through the modification of the customisable 'Classifier'.

The following regular Under redaction anomalies have been noted (real data has been replaced with contextually appropriate placeholders):

1. Missing Names

In many of the cases where a name has been 'missed', it has also been successfully redacted when positioned in a different location within the same body of text. This anomaly could be minimised programmatically by adding extra processing to search the text again, to look for versions of successfully identified name entities.

e.g. If the entity "Fred Taylor" is successfully identified, then all instances of Fred or Taylor or FT should also be removed.

2. Double-barrel surname

Names having a double-barrel surname cause part of the name to be under redacted. The example below resulted in the second part of the surname failing to be redacted.

Mr Fred    PERSON

Sparkes-    PERSON